HF^ i 


-f 


E 249 
.H39 
Copy 1 




I f • '•i^ 


J ^ 



FREDERICK THE GREAT AND 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 



BY 



PAUL LELAND HAWORTU. 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



§immaw Pfetoiat Wimm 



VOL. IX No. 3 



APRIL, 1904 




Glass E:^^ 

Book. 



/-^ 



r ^-^f 



[Reprinted irom The American Historical Review, Vol. IX., No. 3, April, 1904.3 



FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 

In attempting to arrive at a conclusion upon the much-debated 
subject of the attitude of Frederick the Great toward the American 
Revohition, the reader should constantly bear in mind two important 
facts about which there is no room for dispute.^ One of these facts 
is that Frederick entertained an intense hatred for England, and 
was consequently glad to see her humiliated; the other, that his 
interests were such that he was unwilling openly to become her 
enemy. His hatred dated from the year 1761. Up to that time 
the English government, under the leadership of Pitt, whose policy 
was to " conquer America in Germany", had for some years sup- 
ported him in his unequal contest against his allied enemies by 
undertaking the defense of his western frontier against the French 
and by furnishing him an annual subsidy of about £700,000. But 
in 1 761 the Great Commoner was driven out of office; the Tory 
party, led by the Scotch favorite, the Earl of Bute, seized the reins 
of power, and at once proceeded in a most treacherous manner to 
desert their hard-pressed ally by making terms with France. This 
was an action that Frederick never forgave, and thereafter he en- 
tertained toward England, and particularly toward the party in 
iThe most useful source in determining Frederick's attitude is the voluminous cor- 
respondence between him and his ministers at home and abroad. This correspondence, 
in which Frederick expressed himself without reserve, is accessible in the archives at 
Beriin and in transcript form in the Bancroft Papers in the Lenox Library, New York 
city ; yet, strange to say, no American writer, save Bancroft himself, seems to have made 
use of it. Many of the others who have felt called upon to discuss the subject have been 
content to glean their arguments from secondary sources, while a few have consulted the 
diplomatic correspondence of the Revolutionary period in the editions of Sparks or 
Wharton. Unfortunately, even Bancroft did his work under circumstances that rendered 
it difficult for him to be impartial. At the time he wrote his chapter on "The Relations 
of Two New Powers" (Vol. X., original edition, 1874) he was our representative at 
the court of Beriin, and was, there is reason to think, somewhat carried away by his 
enthusiasm for the new German Empire. Consequently he wrote in such a n'ay as 
to cause certain writers, among them M. Henri Doniol, author of the monumental work 
Histoire de la Participation de la France d V Etabliise7nent des Et.its-Unis, to regard 
him as "the inventor of the gratitude due from America to Germany". Adolphe deCir- 
court, Histoire de r Action Commune de la France et de r Ameriqne pour V Independance 
des Etats-Unis, Paris, 1876, Volume IH., contains some of these letters. The subject 
is also discussed in Friedrich Kapp, Friedrich der Grosse und die Vereinigten Staaten 
von America, Leipzig, 1871. A review of the facts with quotations from the correspond- 
ence seems, however, worth while. 

(460) , 



461 p. L. Haw or ill 

power, the most bitter resentment. Nor was tliis feeling lessened 
in intensity when about a decade later, at the time of the first 
partition of Poland, the British intrigued to prevent him from ac- 
quiring Danzig. 

Frederick's writings are full of passages in which he vents his 
hatred toward his former ally. In his Memoirs after the Peace 
occurs the following : " The King of Prussia had more cause for 
complaint than all the rest [of the European powers]. He had to 
reproach the English monarch with the peace he had concluded with 
France, by which England had abandoned Prussia, and with all the 
arts that had been used to dispossess him of the port of Danzig."^ 
He frequently expressed his hostility elsewhere.^ " My indifference 
for this latter power " [England] , he said at one time, " can surprise 
nobody : 'a scalded cat dreads cold water ', says the proverb ; and, in 
fact, what union could be contracted with this crown after the 
signal experience I have had of its duplicity? If it would give me 
all the millions possible, I would not furnish it two small files of 
my troops."^ In the same strain he wrote on January 20, 1778: 
" Meanwhile, I do not wish to dissimulate to you, for however much 
England may attempt to ally herself with me, I will never consent. 
I cannot be won over with money as so many other German princes 
have been. My unalterable determination is not to contract an 
alliance with a power which has deceived me so infamously as did 
England in the last war." 

Against Bute, whom he blamed as the author of the desertion, and 
whom he believed, though wrongly, as we know to-day, to be still 
the power behind the English king and ministry, Frederick enter- 
tained the most intense personal bitterness. " The Scotch earl 
Bute ", he wrote, " governed the king and the kingdom. Resembling 
those malignant spirits of which we continually speak, but which 
we never see, he concealed both himself and his operations in deep 
darkness. His emissaries, his creatures, were the engines by which 
he moved the political machine, according to his will. His system 
of politics was that of the old Tories, who maintained that the hap- 
piness of England required that the king should enjoy despotic 
power."'^ 

1 Frederick's l^Vorks (Holcroft's translation), IV. 179. 

2 See, for example, letters to Baron de Maltzan, his minister to England, January 3, 
1774; November 6, 1775 ; March 31, 1777, in Circourt, III. 162, 179, 208. 

3 Frederick to de Maltzan, April 7, 1777, ibid., 209. When not otherwise stated, 
the reference is to the Bancroft Papers. When the date and the names of writer and 
recipient are given, no note is attached if the letter is in the Bancroft Papers, unless atten- 
tion is called to it as being also in Sparks or Wharton. Most of the letters referred to 
as being in Sparks and Wharton are also in the Bancroft Papers. 

* Works, IV. 172. See for a humorous expression of his hatred for Bute a letter 



Frederick the Great and the Revolution 462 

But though Frederick hated England, and especially the party 
that ruled her, he did not wish to go to war with her. Although 
the first soldier of his age, Frederick wished peace. His concern 
was for Prussia ; and since the dark and stormy days of the Seven 
Years' War, when his kingdom had come so near to shipwreck, 
he had grown cautious. He knew that young Emperor Joseph IL 
was full of ambitious schemes for the aggrandizement of Austria 
and for the humiliation of Prussia, and he was too wise a ruler to 
further the aims of his enemies by allowing personal prejudice to 
lead him into open hostility to such a formidable power as England. 
This attitude is unmistakably revealed in a passage in his Memoirs 
after the Peace. " This ", wrote he regarding his refusal to allow 
the passage across his dominions of German troops hired by Eng- 
land, " was taking but a feeble revenge for the evil proceedings 
relative to the port of Danzig ; neither did the king desire to come 
to extremities. Long experience had taught him that a multitude 
of enemies are found in the world, and that we ought not in sport 
to raise up foes."'^ 

In view of Frederick's hatred of England, it was but natural 
that he should be interested in her troubles with the colonies. As 
early as June 27, 1774, we find him writing to de Maltzan that he 
was " curious to see the end of the Bostonian heroism ",- and that 
he wished de Maltzan to pay attention to the cjuarrel in order to 
keep him well-informed. Later he said that the colonies were evi- 
dently firmly resolved to sustain their liberties and that he disap- 
proved of the English policy.^ Still later he expressed the opinion 
that it was a hundred to one that regulars would be able to beat 
militia, but that the colonies would doubtless be able to make British 
commerce and manufactures suffer greatly, and that Parliament 
might one day regret having pushed things so far. * His judgment 
upon the policy adopted toward the colonies was spoken in no 
uncertain terms. " The treatment which the colonies are experi- 
encing ", he wrote on September 11, 1775, " appears to me to be the 
first step toward despotism ; and if Lord Bute succeeds in it. the 
mother-country will likewise have her turn, and they will attempt 
to subjugate her and to lay down the law to her as they are laying 
it down to the colonies."^ 

to de Maltzan, November 17, 1777. In another letter, dated Dec. 18, 1777, he wrote, 
" Quand les Bretons un Lord Bute pendront, Lors leurs guerres par tout prosperont." 

1 Works, IV. 178. 

^Circourt, III. 162. 

3 Frederick to de Maltzan, November 14, 1774, ibid., 163. 

* Frederick to de Maltzan, February 6 and May 15, 1775, ibid., 168, 172. 

^Frederick to de Maltzan September II, 1775, ilii(L, 176. 



463 p. L. Haworth 

But, though he disapproved of the English pohcy, he felt that 
the matter was one in which he was not directly concerned. On 
February 27, 1775, he said that he did not intend to meddle in the 
quarrel, but a week later he expressed satisfaction over the fact 
that the more confused the English affairs became, the less there 
would be to apprehend for the peace of Europe.^ In the following 
June he declared that he would continue to be a " tranquil spectator ", 
and would " await the denouement of the scene with indifference."^ 
The first suggestion made to Frederick that he should form a 
connection with the Americans appears to have come from de 
Maltzan, who had been approached by an American agent in Lon- 
don.^ De Maltzan proposed that the king should open commercial 
relations with the Americans ; but Frederick replied : " What you 
add concerning the establishment of a direct commerce appears to 
me, considering the actual relations between my state and America, 
still very problematical. Of all the merchandise in exchange, 
Virginia tobacco would be the principal article. But without a navy 
how do you expect me to protect such a commerce or make it 
respected?"'* A month later he expressed himself again in much 
the same terms.^ 

In the following November a more direct overture was made 
to the Prussian monarch. In that month William Carmichael was 
sent by Silas Deane, then agent of the colonies in Paris, to Berlin 
to make proposals of a commercial nature.*' Carmichael accom- 
plished nothing of importance. He explained the character of Amer- 
ican products to the Prussian authorities, but found Frederick un- 
willing to undertake a direct commerce, though he expressed him- 
self willing to exchange commodities through the ports of France.'^ 
The next attempt at an understanding was made by the three Amer- 
ican commissioners, Deane, Franklin, and Lee, who, in pursuance 
of the so-called " militia " diplomatic policy, on February 14, 1777, 
transmitted to the Prussian court copies of the Declaration of 
Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, and in a letter 
expressed a desire to obtain Frederick's friendship and to lay be- 
fore him a plan for commercial intercourse.^ 

1 Frederick to de Maltzan, February 27 and March 6, 1775, ibid., 170, 171. 

2 Frederick to de Maltzan, June 29, 1775, ibid., 173. 
3De Maltzan to Frederick, May 21, 1776. 

^Frederick to de Maltzan, June 3, 1776, Circourt, III. 195. 

5 Frederick to de Maltzan, July I, 1776, ibid., 196. 

6 Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, Oct. I, Dec. 3, 1776; Car- 
michael to the same, Nov. 2, 1776 : in Sparks and Wharton ; Barnier to Eden, Dec. 14, 
21, 1776. 

' Schulenburg to Frederick, November 30 and December 2, 1776; Frederick to 
Goltz, December 2, 1776. 

8 Circourt, III. 6. 



Frederick the Great and the Revohttion 464 

Concerning the proposals made in this letter Frederick wrote 
from Potsdam to Baron Schnlenburg, his minister of state, ex- 
pressing to him the opinion that since Prussia was without a navy 
to protect such a commerce, it would be necessary to make use of 
a foreign flag. But he added : 

However, in spite of these considerations, I do not wish to disoblige 
nor to offend the colonies by a complete refusal of the propositions of 
their plenipotentiary commissioners at Paris, and it appears to me to be 
more expedient for you by a civil answer to attempt to keep them in the 
friendly disposition they appear to entertain towards us. . . In this way 
the above-mentioned colonies will not be offended, and we shall have 
the means of entering into negotiations with them should circumstances 
become more favorable. Then our Silesian linens, our woolens, and 
other manufactured articles can find a new market. . . All that I recom- 
mend to you, then, is to put nothing into your answer to the said pleni- 
potentiaries that can displease or offend their employers, but explain 
your position toward their offer as favorably as possible, so that "the 
moment events become more propitious there we may be able to take 
advantage of it.^ 

From this and other extracts already quoted it is easy to see 
that Frederick's policy was, outwardly at least, to maintain a strict 
neutrality ; for, although he was quite willing to see England 
humiliated, his interests dictated that he should not become em- 
broiled in a war with her. In pursuance of this policy it was im- 
possible for him to fall in with the proposals of the colonists, yet at 
the same time he wished to avoid offending them, for he hoped 
thereby to keep a way for opening a profitable commerce with them 
in case they should prove successful. 

On March 15 Schulenburg wrote to the commissioners and stated 
something of Frederick's position. On the nineteenth of the fol- 
lowing month the commissioners again wrote a letter in which they 
informed Schulenburg that an accredited minister would be sent 
to Berlin ''properly empowered to treat upon affairs of importance ", 
and that in order to hasten the establishment of a commerce, one of 
their own number would shortly visit the Prussian court. The 
plan did not meet the approval of Frederick, so he wrote to Schulen- 
burg that the colonies were '' in too much of a hurry with their 
propositions for a formal negotiation ", and restated the position 
he had taken in his letter of March 12.- Schulenburg, therefore, 
wrote to Arthur Lee, the conmiissioner chosen to undertake the 
mission,'' in order to discourage him from coming to Berlin.^ But 
since Lee journeyed by way of Vienna, it would seem that the letter 

1 Frederick to Schulenburg, March 12, 1777. See also Kapp, 22-23. 

2 Frederick to Schulenburg, May 6, 1777, Circourt, III. 89. 

3 Arthur Lee to Schulenburg, May 8, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
^Schulenburg to Arthur Lee, May 20, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 



465 PL. Hazuoi'tJi 

did not reach him until after his departure from Paris, and perhaps 
not until his arrival at Berlin. 

When Lee reached Berlin, he announced his presence there in 
a short note to Schulenburg.^ Two days later he wrote a longer 
letter in which he discussed the advantages that would result from 
commercial relations, and also said, " If I had known His Majesty's 
pleasure before my departure, I should have acted in conformity 
with it. And if my residence here should give the least uneasiness 
to your court, I rely upon your excellency's informing me of it." 
Schulenburg replied that his residence at Berlin would not be at 
all disagreeable to the king, provided Lee lived as an individual and 
without assuming a public character. \\\ the same letter he asked 
for " a memorandum of places where insurance can be effected on 
vessels destined for America, and the premium of insurance to be 
paid."^ Next day Lee sent the desired information, and added that 
if the powers of Europe would but open their ports to American 
war vessels, the problem of commerce would be solved, for then 
convoys could be fitted out to protect the vessels engaged in it.^ 
Schulenburg admitted that a commerce between the two countries 
would probably be profitable, but said that on account of the scanti- 
ness of the Prussian merchant marine an effort would have to be 
made to get the owners of vessels in Holland and Hamburg to 
carry the goods.'* Of course Lee was very far from being content 
with this answer, for he realized that such a commerce would be 
of very little importance, and his great aim was to get the Prussian 
king to commit himself on the side of the Americans. Accordingly, 
he informed Schulenburg that since the American merchant vessels 
were also privateers, the only possible way to establish a commerce 
" hither in the commodities and vessels of the States " would be to 
open the Prussian ports to the privateers. ° Schulenburg replied, 
however, that while the king was well disposed towards the Amer- 
icans, he could not afford to embroil himself with the court of 
London. " Moreover," said he, " our ports have hitherto received 
only merchant vessels, and no ships of war nor privateers have ever 
entered there, so that the officers stationed at our ports would be 
embarrassed how to conduct themselves on such an occasion." Be- 
fore a final answer could be given, it would be necessary to ascertain 
the attitude taken by France and Spain concerning the reception of 
privateers." 

'A. Lee to Schulenburg, June 5, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 

2 Schulenburg to A. Lee, June 9, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 

3 A. Lee to Schulenburg, June 10, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
' Schulenburg to A. Lee, June 18, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
5 A. Lee to Schulenburg, June 20, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
^Schulenburg to A. Lee, June 26, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 



Frederick the Great and the Revolution 466 

In these negotiations Schulenburg was but the mouthpiece of 
his master, and from the latter's instructions to the minister and 
from his other correspondence it is not difficult to determine Fred- 
erick's attitude. On June 23 he had written from Potsdam to 
Schulenburg in Berlin, " It is necessary to continue the same tone 
with him and to tell him that although I am well disposed toward 
his constituents, he will himself feel that they ought not to expect 
that in order to favor them I should embroil myself with England."^ 
Frederick was, in fact, playing a waiting game. To his brother, 
Prince Henry, he had written about a week earlier, " I purpose to 
draw out this negotiation in order to fall in with the side for which 
Fortune shall declare herself." In a similar strain he had written 
to Baron Goltz, his minister to France : '* x*\s to the deputies of the 
Congress, I still hesitate as to the course to take toward them. It 
is necessary to await the turn in their affairs."- To de Maltzan at 
London he wrote, *' There has arrived at my court a deputy of the 
colonies to propose to me a commercial treaty; but as their inde- 
pendence is not yet decided, you will readily see that I have not 
wished to enter into negotiations with him."'' At that time, with the 
outcome of the expeditions of Howe and Burgoyne uncertain, the 
prospects of the colonies were not very bright, and consequently 
Frederick was more than usually unwilling to do in their behalf 
anything that would bring upon him the resentment of England. 
At the same time, however, he wished to avoid offending the colonies, 
for he foresaw that the time might come when it would be desirable 
to have a way open for a commercial connection. Because of his 
dislike for England he naturally inclined to wish that the colonies 
would prove successful; but, as he many times wrote, the whole 
matter was really indiff'erent to him. 

The negotiations were now complicated by an extraordinary 
episode. The English minister, Hugh Elliot, a man whom Fincken- 
stein characterized as " very young and very rash ",-" had naturally 
taken great interest in the presence of Lee in Berlin. As a result of 
this interest a servant of the English embassy entered Lee's lodgings, 
broke open his desk, and stole his papers. By some writers it has 
been asserted that the English minister directly instigated this re- 
markable robbery, and Bancroft states that the robber was hired for 
1,000 guineas.^ Such may have been the case. Years afterward, 
however, Elliot assured John Ouincy Adams upon his word of honor 
that the servant acted without express orders and merely out of the 

1 Circourt, III. 95. 

2 Frederick to Goltz, June 7, 1777, ibid., 92. 

3 Frederick to de Maltzan, June 23, 1777, ibid., 94. 
^ Finckenstein to Schulenburg, June 28, 1777. 
'Bancroft, IX. 174 (original edition, 1866). 



467 P' L. HazuoiHh 

knowledge that Elliot was curious to know what headway Lee was 
making in his negotiations.^ However this may have been, there is 
no question that, the papers once obtained, Elliot was not above 
looking them over. Copies of them were taken, after which the 
originals were left on Lee's staircase, while the servant was spirited 
out of the kingdom. - 

The theft caused much comment at Berlin, and made Frederick 
very angry, but he took no violent action against the English min- 
ister. His attitude in the matter is revealed in the following extract 
from a letter to de Maltzan : 

But I must tell you of an act of singular daring and recklessness on 
the part of Chevalier Elliot. That minister took the liberty, through 
one of his domestics, of abstracting the portfolio of Lee, the American, 
from his desk in the auherge de Corsica, in Berlin ; and the theft having 
made a noise, he not only brought back the portfolio to the American, 
but, moreover, came himself to avow the theft to my minister, with all 
the circumstances that accompanied it, making various poor excuses for 
the part he took in it. It is properly what is called a public theft ; and 
if I had wished to make him feel the resentment which the law of nations 
authorizes, and which he richly deserved, I would immediately have for- 
bidden him the court. But having himself told his fault, and having 
submitted his person and his sentence to my discretion and generosity, 
I did not wish to push things to an extreme, and confined myself to noti- 
fying him through my ministers of the impropriety and lawlessness of his 
conduct. 

Such, in fine, is the minister whom the court where you are has 
chosen to reside at mine, and you can judge very well what would have 
been the sensation created by a similar performance there, and how the 
chevalier Elliot would have been regarded. It is in the school of Bute 
that such scholars are found. 

[In the handwriting of Frederick.] Oh ! the worthy pupil of Bute ! 
Oh! C homme incomparable que voire Gott Damme Elliot .' In truth, the 
English ought to blush with shame at sending such ministers to foreign 
courts.' 

The British government made haste to disavow the action of its 
minister, both through that minister himself and also through de 
Maltzan, and Frederick was told that he was at liberty to signify 
a desire for Elliot's recall.^ But the king was not desirous of fur- 
ther straining his relations with England, so he gave to Hertzberg 

' J. Q. Adams, Letters on Silesia, London, 1804, 257-258. 

2 For accounts of the theft see Lee to the Commissioners, June 28, 1777, and to the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1777 ; Frederick to de Maltzan, June 30, 1777, 
Circourt, III, 211 ; Hertzberg to Frederick, June 28, 1777 ; and otlier letters. A portion 
of this correspondence is given by Sparks and Wharton. Carlyle's Frederick, VL 343- 
345, contains a not very accurate account of the affair. See also the North American 
Review for April, 1830. 

3 Frederick to de Maltzan, June 30, 1777, Circourt, IIL 211; in Sparks and Wharton. 
^Hertzberg to Frederick, June 28, June 30, August li, and August 26, 1777 ; de 

Maltzan to Frederick, August i, 1777 ; etc. 



Frederick the Great and the Revolutio7i 468 

this lffl7''r,'""f "" " ' "° ""' ""^'^ ^ "°- '° "^e made over 
. hf k ;. £ E " "T ° f '^^ "- '° '^'™ "'^' ™' °f consideration 

natter in lecf"' Toll t ' °™ ^T"' T ™'" ^^^^ ^^ '"^ 
theft hnt 1,-fH V . ' '''" '"^''^ ''^^^ ^"ft'e'-ed from the 

heft, but httle satisfaction was o-iven,=^ except what might be o-ained 
irom receivino- i rr.t->A. r^t i-u ■ i^'^feiiu ue gamea 

been be^m bewT , ""^'^facy proceedings, which had 
to" coov he , ^^ ""'"" °' '"^ "'^f ''»d become known, 

fide tvT,Kl u 3 r "" '" P™""e '° his associates his own 
fhi ck 1 T ■■■ " 7"'''' '^°"'^-^' t^ - ™-'ake to infer from 

.ta",* he err- FrTde'::: 1';:^ ,1 ^"^ ""^'™"'-^^ 

keeping ont of the stru^^le T, Tl '""» •"' P""'^^ "' 

did no^ feel totiM ^ ''' "°"''''' '"^ ''"S""' b«t he 

a not led that it was w,se to p,„,ish it; for, while the resentment 

of the CO on.es was not a thing to be feared, that of England was 

Shortly afterward Lee quitted Berlin for Paris, but tiot beTore 

he had received a definite answer upon the points in the „ "otat, 

fst ;":?.;:/x?:f^rk'''^ ''"'"'^- -- - -«■' 

hon. ^f "'§^ "' jeopardy without giving the 

otil::LiiL:t'^:s:r" "'- ^'-- -^ -- - 

The later negotiations were carried on entirelv bv correspondence 
Lee had obtamed permission to keep the Prussian crulrmed 

vantage of the permission to write two letters urgin- that the 
Prussian ports be opened ,0 American vessels.-- On ceill he 
second letter .Schulenburg transmitted a translation of iTtoFrd 
nek with a request for instructions." Frederick's reply posses es 
such significance that it should never be lost sio-ht J^/°'''''" 
seeking^o nravel the king, policy, and al, ll^^ cl'e p l::: 

erick w ote " Mit Co '°r "'"?'" °' Schulenburgs letter Fred- 
with c:,:;;ment: ■ ''"™"'"' ^'*^'^^^" "• "-^ '^- - P-* ^im off 

> Frederick to Hertzberg on Hertzberg's letter of August ii 1777 

2 A. LeetoFrederick, July 1,1777. Frederick to A T t V ^^' 
and Wharton See also SchuLburft; ^redlS "uly 3"; 7^ '' ''''' '°'^ ^" ^^^^^ 

•^Schulenburg to Frederick, July 6, 1777 

*Schulenburg to Frederick, lulv 6 1777. T ». . r- 
July 29, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton ^' ' '^°""""'' °' ^°'-^'> ^ff-r^, 

*A. Lee to Schulenburg, Aueust i-> nnH c: , , 
Wharton. ^' "^"'' '-^ ""^ September 21, 1777, {„ gparks and 

e^Schulenburg to Frederick, October 6, 1777. 



469 P- L- Hawoj'th 

more recruits from Germany, Russia, or Denmark/ Schulenhurg re- 
ferred Lee's request to Frederick, and upon Schulenburg's letter the 
king wrote, " none from Russia, none from Denmark, but some men 
from Anspach, and from the prince of Hesse." ^ In consenting that 
Schulenburg should give this information Frederick showed him- 
self in perhaps the most friendly attitude toward the colonies in 
which he had yet appeared. 

About the same time Frederick refused to allow the passage of 
the mercenary troops from Baireuth, Anspach, and Cassel across his 
dominions,^ and some writers have seen in this action another evi- 
dence of his friendship for America. His correspondence and 
other writings do not bear out this theory. To his minister to 
England he wrote that he refused their passage because of certain 
mutinies that had taken place among the mercenaries the year before 
while they vs^eje on their way to enibark. * A passage already quoted 
from his Memoirs after the Peace shows that the refusal gave him 
some pleasure because it disobliged England. In the same work 
he states that he refused because he did not like to see Germany 
denuded of troops, ■' Furthermore, he was doubtless disgusted by 
the sight of Germans being sold like cattle, and wished to discourage 
the practice. In refusing passage to the mercenaries he does not, 
however, seem to have thought, as some writers have asserted, that 
he was thereby bestowing belligerent rights upon the colonies, for, 
as will later be seen, he for a time withdrew the prohibition. 

Frederick continued steadfast in the determination not to enter 
into formal diplomatic relations with the colonies until he was able 
to see on which side Fortune would declare herself. On November 
17, 1777, Arthur Lee wrote to Schulenburg stating that Congress 
had appointed his brother, William Lee, commissioner to the Prus- 
sian court with powers to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce, 
and requesting to be informed as to whether it was the king's pleas- 
ure that his brother should come to Berlin. But Schulenburg 
replied that the king " cannot possibly conjecture, as circumstances 
have not changed, what propositions Mr. Lee can make more 
acceptable to His Majesty, nor consequently what can be the object 
of his mission. "° 

On the fourth of the following month Arthur Lee wrote to 
Schulenburg confirming the glorious news of the surrender of 

' A. Lee to Schulenburg, October 23, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
''Schulenburg to Frederick, November 4, 1777, Circourt, III. 116. 
3 Frederick to Goltz, November lo, 1777, ioid., 116; Elliot to Suffolk, November 
8, II, and 16, 1777, ibid., 8, 9. 

* Frederick to de Maltzan, November 17 and 28, 1777. ^ Works, IV. 178. 

6 Schulenburg to A. Lee, November 28, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. IX. — \\ . 



Frederick the Great and the Revolution 470 

Burgoyne. Schulenburg transmitted the letter to Frederick at 
Potsdam/ and the king received the news with great satisfaction. 
Upon the letter he wrote : " This is very good, but it is necessary 
to tell him that I expect (fattens) to recognize the independence 
of the Americans when France shall have set the example." Ac- 
cordingly, Schulenburg wrote to Lee : " I am much pleased, sir, with 
these favorable events. ... I can assure you, sir, that His Majesty 
will not be the last power to recognize the independence of the Ameri- 
cans, but you will yourself feel that it is not natural that he should 
be the first, and that at least France, whose political and commercial 
interests are more immediately connected with yours, should set the 
example."- Six weeks later Schulenburg again wrote to Lee in 
the same favorable strain. " Hi^ Majesty wishes that your gen- 
erous efforts may be crowned with complete success ; and, as I have 
already advised you, in my letter of December 18, he will not hesitate 
to acknowledge your independence whenever France, which is more 
interested in the event of this contest, shall set the example." He 
added that the Americans were at liberty to purchase arms in 
Prussia and that the " bankers Splittgerber, contractors for the 
manufacture of arms, have received directions to deliver such as you 
may demand."^ 

Taking advantage of this permission, Arthur Lee soon after- 
wards purchased of Messrs. Splittgerber eight hundred fusils of a 
kind that Schulenburg had recommended as being cheap but service- 
able. Later he discovered that the guns were " of the worst and most 
ordinary workmanship " ; they were old worn-out muskets such as 
even the American militia would reject. Towards the close of 1778 
Lee demanded of Schulenburg that Messrs. Splittgerber be com- 
pelled to do him justice*; but Schulenburg replied that the matter 
was one which must be left to the courts, and ironically added that 
Lee, as a good republican, ought to be aware that the Prussian 
king had no despotic power to force the righting of private breaches 
of contract." Thus the result of the permission to purchase arms in 
Prussia was far from being advantageous to the Americans. 

Frederick's motives for expressing his intention of recognizing 
the Americans when France should have set the example will prob- 
ably never be determined. He may have thought that Fortune had 
at last declared herself against England and that the end of the 

1 Schulenburg to Frederick, December 15, 1777, Circourt, III. 125. 
^Schulenburg to A. Lee, December 18, 1777, in Sparks and Wharton. 
3 Schulenburg to A. Lee, January 16, 1778, in Sparks and Wharton; partly given in 
Circourt, IIL 131. 

* A. Lee to Schulenburg, October 21, 1778, in Sparks and Wharton. 
5 Schulenburg to A. Lee, December i, 1778. 



471 P. L. HawortJi 

war was close at hand. Perhaps, with Machiavellian craftiness, he 
expected that the contents of his letter to Lee would be communi- 
cated to the French ministry and would influence them to declare 
for the Americans and thus become embroiled with England. What- 
ever his motives may have been, it is unlikely, in view of the obstinate 
determination of the English to continue the war, that he would 
have hazarded following France. Just what his action would have 
been under the conditions then existing on the continent will never 
\ ' be known, for an unexpected event occurred which soon resulted in 
complications that required all his attention. On December 30. 
1777, died Max Joseph, elector of Bavaria. Immediately the 
ambitious young Emperor Joseph II. proceeded to lay claim to the 
dead prince's domains and to back up his. claims by force of arms. 
The aged Frederick, feeble though he was and averse to war, felt 
it necessary to oppose this aggression on the part of Austria and 
ultimately to wage the short and comparatively bloodless Bavarian 
War.^ In consequence, he had little time to think of the struggle 
in far-ofif America, and was obliged to be doubly cautious not to 
become engaged in hostilities with a power which held Hanover and 
which was on friendly terms with many of the German princes 
whose support he craved. 

It was not long before Frederick was pointing out that he now 
had no time to think of the war in America. " But the fermenta- 
tion of affairs in Germany ", he wrote March 12 to de Maltzan, 
" makes me forget that of England with her colonies." He expressed 
himself in much the same terms when the Americans again pressed 
their negotiations. When William Lee, after the alliance with 
France had been consummated, wrote to say that he was hopeful 
that His Majesty would think it good for him to repair to Berlin, 
he met with the response- that the king was too much occupied with 
Germany to think of America, and that while he would, were cir- 
cumstances favorable, willingly recognize American independence, 
such action would at that juncture be of no advantage to America 
and prejudicial to Prussia. 

Later in the same month the king again instructed Schulenburg 
to refuse to enter into a commercial connection with the Americans 
and to advise them to cultivate relations with maritime states.^ 
Thus the king's promise to recognize the colonies when France 
should set the example was not fulfilled. 

1 Works, IV. 205-271. 

2 The answer written on the margin of a letter from Schulenburg to Frederick, 
March 30, 1778. 

3 On Schulenburg's letter to Frederick, March 30, 1778. 



Frederick the Great and the Revolution 472 

So much embarrassed, in fact, did Frederick find himself as a 
result of the emperor's ambitious designs upon Bavaria that on 
March 16, 1778, he wrote to de Maltzan in order to inquire whether 
there was any probability that England would be willing to furnish 
Hanoverian troops to defend the Germanic Constitution against the 
emperor's encroachments. In asking for this information he 
cautioned his minister against letting the English government sus- 
pect that he wished to learn anything upon the subject; nevertheless, 
the letter is certainly in a different strain from one written four 
years earlier in which the king had said that it was as likely that 
a good Christian should league himself with the devil as he with 
England. As it happened, nothing of importance ever came of 
the inquiry ; but Frederick did at times show a somewhat more 
obliging spirit toward England, and at various times granted per- 
mission, at the request of Elliot, for the passage of German mer-^ 
cenaries across his dominions.^ 

At times Frederick seems to have grown tired of the persistency 
of the American agent. Thus, on ]\\\\ 30, 1778, he ordered Schulen- 
burg to write to the agent once more " what I have already ten times 
said." Again, in the following December we find Schulenburg 
transmitting to Finckenstein, who was with the king at Breslau, a 
letter from William Lee, and explaining his reason for doing so as 
follows : " This letter embarrasses me, particularly because the king, 
when I presented to His Majesty in the summer another from the 
agent, seemed to me to be a little disgusted at his returning so often 
to the charge."- Finckenstein must have shown Lee's letter to 
Frederick, for on the ninetenth of the same month Frederick wrote 
to Schulenburg that the American proposed nothing new and that 
the same answer should be given to him as hitherto. 

Even after the close of the short Bavarian War the Prussian king 
continued without material change. the attitude that he had adopted 
at the beginning of that struggle. What was the only approach, 
in the remotest degree, to a concession will appear from the follow- 
ing extract from a letter written by Schulenburg to William Lee 
on January 2, 1779: "I have the honor, to tell you, sir, that the / 
ports of His Majesty are open to all nations who come there to 
trade in goods the importation of which is not forbidden in his states, 
so that the merchants from America will have no need of express 
permission in order to enter freely and be well received in the port 
of Emden or such other as they may choose." He said, however, 

1 Frederick to de Maltzan, February 15, 1780 ; Elliot to Suffolk, February 28, 1778, 
and January 7, 1779- 

'■^Schulenburg to Finckenstein, December 8, 177S. 



473 P. L. Hazvorth 

that the king would not protect the commerce of one nation against 
another, nor shelter in his ports prizes taken by another power. 
In commenting upon the matter a week later Frederick told Schulen- 
burg that if the Americans wished to come into Emden, it was well 
and good, but that he could not promise to protect them, and that 
a perfect neutrality must more than ever be preserved. 

Following up the slight encouragement given by Schulenburg, 
William Lee asked for " an express convention or at least for a 
positive declaration from His Majesty that he comprehends the 
United States in the number of nations " who might enter and 
trade in the Prussian ports. ^ But Schulenburg was not to be thus 
drawn into what would have constituted a formal recognition of 
the colonies ; he merely replied that further assurances appeared to 
him to be superfluous and unnecessary. - 

From this time onward the relations of the two powers con- 
tinued without material change until the close of the Revolution. 
The independence of the colonies was not recognized by Frederick 
until after it had been recognized by England herself, and it was 
not until June of 1783 that Baron Goltz at Paris made overtures to 
Franklin for a commercial agreement between the two countries.^ 

From the evidence that has been advanced it is clear that the 
colonies gained but slight advantage from their direct negotiations 
with the Prussian monarch. At the same time it is unquestionably 
true that his course in the European politics of the period was, be.- 
cause of coincident interests, of considerable benefit to the struggling 
patriots across the Atlantic. This was true of Frederick's relations 
with France. About the time the Revolution broke out conditions 
were such in Europe that he deemed it desirable to cultivate the 
friendship of that power. In the ambitious projects of Joseph 
II. the Prussian king saw a grave menace to the peace of the con- 
tinent and to the interests of his own kingdom.* At the moment 
Frederick found himself without any other ally than Russia, and 
there was " reason to fear ", he thought, " that a new war in the 
Crimea might prevent the empress of Russia from furnishing the 
king with that aid which she was by treaty obliged to furnish".^ 
Frederick, therefore, deemed it wise to seek an alliance with France. 
But in the attempt he had a rival. Joseph, too, courted that power 
and wished to continue the alliance that existed during the Seven 
Years' War. In accomplishing this end he counted much upon the 

' W. Lee to Schulenburg, January 30, 1779. 
2 Schulenburg to W. I.ee, February 17, 1779. 
'Goltz to Frederick, June 20, 1783. 
■• Works, IV. 191 et scq. 
^Ibid., IV. 198. 



Frederick the Great and the Revohition 474 

aid of the French queen, his sister Marie Antoinette. Against 
him, however, was the old French feeling- of hostility to the House 
of Hapsburg and the knowledge that the previous alliance had been 
productive of much disaster. 

The situation was rendered much more complicated bv the war 
in America. The natural enemy of France was England, and it was 
almost inevitable that France should seize upon so favorable an 
opportunity in order to take revenge for the losses inflicted upon 
her in the previous war. This the far-sighted Frederick early fore- 
saw, and, although he foresaw also the ruinous effects of a new war 
upon enfeebled France, his desire to see England humbled and his 
anxiety that France should find occupation outside of Germany led 
him to encourage the French court to enter the struggle.^ 

The diplomatic contest resulted in Frederick's favor. Although 
Joseph even visited Paris in pursuance of his object, he found the 
French king and ministry disinclined to listen to his proposals, while 
the influence of his sister was too slight to bring to pass what he 
had at heart.- Later the French showed themselves friendly to 
Frederick, and through a French agent, sent to him under pretext 
of attending the midsummer reviews of 1777 at Magdeburg, the 
Prussian monarch succeeded in arriving at an understanding with 
the French court upon the question of the foreign policy of the two 
powers.=^ Thereafter Frederick continued to encourage France in 
her desire to humble Rngland and to assure her of his neutrality in 
case of a st^iggle.'* 

That these representations were influential in leading the court 
of France to take up the American cause is not to be doubted. Had 
Frederick's influence been thrown instead in favor of England, it 
is quite conceivable that the treaty of 1778 might never have been 
made. Thus by his attitude the Prussian king rendered consider- 

1 Frederick to de Maltzan, September 28, 1776 ; to Goltz, April 23, June 11, June 
29, October 3, November 14, December 9, 1776, and January 2, 1777, etc.; Circourt, 
68, 71, 73. Circourt gives the letter of April 23 incorrecdy as April 25. 

2 Frederick to Goltz, January 2, 1777 ; Works, IV. 189-201. 

3 Frederick to Goltz, May 8, June I, June 7, June 11, 1777; Goltz to Frederick, 
June 26, 1777; cf. Circourt, III. 90, 92, 93, 95. 

' " No, certainly," he wrote to Baron Goltz on July 31, 1777, for the information of 
France, " we have no jealousy of the aggrandizement ofY ranee. We even pray for her 
success provided her armies are not found near Wesel or Halberstadt." " You can 
assure M. de Maurepas", he instructed the same minister in the following August, 
"that I have no connection whatever with England, rtor do I grudge to France any ad- 
vantages she may gain by war with the colonies." " The independence of the colonies 
will be worth to France all that the war will cost" ; " I wager a hundred to one that in 
case a rupture between the two crowns should break out next year, France could promise 
herself some great advantages", are two sentences taken from among dozens of similar 
ones contained in letters written by him to Goltz during the next few months (see Cir- 
court, III. 9S-128). 



475 P. L. Haworth 

able service to the colonies. But it should be borne in mind that 
nowhere is there any evidence to show that the favorable influence 
he exerted sprang out of a love for the struggling patriots across the 
Atlantic. 

In Russia also Frederick secretly opposed the English, and as 
he was in alliance with the Empress Catharine, his influence was 
considerable. While he seems to have had no direct connection 
with the refusal of the empress in 1776 to furnish troops to England, 
his advice in the years that followed was no small factor in de- 
termining her policy.^ At the Russian court there were two rival 
parties, headed respectively by Count Panin, who was minister of 
foreign afl""airs, and Prince Potemkin ; Panin was very friendly to 
Frederick and was opposed to England, while Potemkin, who wished 
to discredit his rival, came in time, through the efforts of the Eng- 
lish minister, to lean toward the side of England. In matters of 
foreign afl'airs, however, the empress generally followed the advice 
of Panin, and hence the wishes of Frederick had great weight. The 
English w^ere well aware that Frederick's influence was being cast 
against them, but were unable to do anything to counteract it, for 
on the subject of the desirability of allowing England to be humbled 
Panin and the Prussian king were in complete accord." 

One of the things that Frederick's influence brought about 
which was contrary to English interests was a more friendly feeling 
between the courts of Russia and of France,^ but his greatest triumph 
in this direction was in connection with the formation of the Armed 
Neutrality. In the early months of 1780 the Russian vessel Con- 
cordia was seized by the Spaniards, who were now at war with Eng- 
land, and was carried into Cadiz. Angered by this insult to her 
flag, the empress caused a memorial to be drawn up and presented to 
the Spanish minister. This had hardly been done before news 
arrived at St. Petersburg of the seizure of a second vessel. There- 
upon the empress, without consulting Panin, ordered her navy to be 
prepared for active service and adopted measures for the protection 
of her commerce against the belligerents.* The moment was a most 
critical one. Prince Potemkin professed to Harris the belief that at 
last a great triumph had been gained for England.^ But when 
Panin was informed of wdiat the empress had done, he quickly 

1 Bancroft, V. 97 (ed. 1878). 

2 Harris to Suffolk, February 2, 6, 10, and 24, 1778 ; to Sir J. Yorke, February 13, 
1778 ; to Weymouth, June 4, 25, August 18, September 20, 1779, February 26, 1780; 
to Eden, June 29, July 30, 1779 ; and numerous other letters in Malmesbury Diaries and 
Correspondence, 1844. Frederick to Solms, August 14, 1779, Circourt, III. 225; Goertz 
to Frederick, September 24, 1779, ibid., 227. 

3 Works, IV. 201. 

* Goertz to Frederick, February 29 and March 3, 1780, Circourt, Til. 235, 238. 
5 Harris to Stormont, February 26, 1780, in Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence. 



Frede7nck the Great and the RevulutioiL 476 

evolved an adroit plan to turn her action to the disadvantage of the 
English. This plan he confided to Goertz, and on February 29, 1780, 
Goertz wrote to Frederick : 

All will now depend upon the reply the Spanish court makes to the 
remonstrances. If it gives a satisfactory one, as they have a right to ex- 
pect, then I agree with Count Panin in thinking that this new intrigue 
will result to the disadvantage of the one who contrived it and of his 
court. If unhappily the court of Spain persists in its false measures, the 
worst is to be feared. . . . Your Majesty will be best able to enlighten her 
in the matter, and having already proved your impartiality, you have a 
right at so important a moment to speak with frankness. ' 

Upon receipt of this intelligence Frederick saw the importance of 
action. On March 14 he sent to his minister at Paris instructions 
to " demand a particular audience of the ministry at Versailles ", 
and to use every endeavor to induce them to impress upon the 
Spanish court " the absolute necessity of satisfying Russia without 
the slightest delay on an article where the honor of her flag is so 
greatly interested."- The French minister, Vergennes, read Fred- 
erick's letter, and despatched a copy of it to the French representative 
at Madrid with orders to use all his influence to get Spain to 
apologize." The Spanish court saw the wisdom of such a course 
and followed it. A satisfactory answer was given to Russia, and a 
possible war was thereby averted.* 

Later both France and Spain, partly because of advice given bv 
Frederick, acquiesced in the new maritime code that the empress had 
promulgated on March 8, 1780.'^ Thus, through the adroit manage- 
ment of Panin and the assistance rendered by Frederick, a declara- 
tion that the English minister had hoped would result in an armed 
conflict between Russia and the family of the Bourbons became in 
the end a measure wholly opposed to the interests of England. By 
the part he played in bringing about this result — comparatively 
unimportant as the Armed Neutrality really proved — Frederick un- 
questionably contributed indirectly to the success of the colonies. 

It was, in fact, in ways such as these that whatever assistance 
the colonies received from Frederick was chiefly rendered. The 
direct assistance he gave them was certainly very slight. He did 
not recognize their independence until it had been recognized by Eng- 
land herself. His commercial concessions were of little real value; 
his permission to purchase arms in his dominions resulted, though 

' Ibid., 237-238. 

^Ibid., 241. 

3 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 27, 1780. 

^Goertz to Frederick, May 2, 1780. 

•^Goertz to Frederick, March 10, Circourt, III, 240, May 2, 1780, and other letters. 



477 P. L. Haworth 

through no fault of his own, in a disastrous bargain for the Ameri- 
cans. He gave a Httle good advice and a small amount of informa- 
tion, but, on the whole, what he did directly was really very trivial. 
On the other hand, the indirect aid which he rendered as a result of 
coincident interests was more important. Had he been a friend to 
England instead of being secretly in opposition to her, it is quite 
conceivable that the course of history might have been materially 
changed. The relations between Russia and England might have 
been different. Certainly France would have hesitated longer. 
Probably the minor German states would have furnished England 
with more mercenaries. But " what might have been " is specula- 
tion pure and simple. 

Less difficult to determine are the motives that moved Frederick 
in his policy toward the colonies. As has already been pointed out, 
he hated England with great intensity, yet at the same time he saw 
clearly that the interests of his kingdom demanded that he should 
not become her open enemy. In consequence, he carried his hostility 
just far enough not to embroil him in a war with England. He 
would not recognize the colonies because that would have taken him 
over the danger line. At times he even performed friendly acts and 
exercised great forbearance in order to prevent his relations with 
England from becoming too strained ; instances are his leniency 
toward Elliot in the matter of the theft of Lee's papers, and his 
giving permission for the mercenaries to cross his dominions. On 
the other hand, as a result of his hatred for England, it was psycho- 
logically natural that he should feel well-disposed toward the colo- 
nies. But it would be easy to overestimate this feeling of friendship. 
Nowhere is there any evidence to show that he had a very deep interest 
in the colonies for their own sake. Unquestionably he wished them 
success, but all expressions of friendship made by him or his ministers 
should be scrutinized in the light of his avowed intention to pro- 
crastinate in the negotiations and of his instruction to Schulenburg, 
" Mit Complimenten abweissen." Frederick was, indeed, very much 
interested in the contest ; of this the hundreds of letters in which he 
mentioned the subject are proof conclusive. But the reader of these 
letters can see with half an eye that it is in the effect of the war 
upon England and upon the politics of Europe that he was chiefly 
interested, not in its effects upon the colonies. At one time a story 
was widely current, and it is still believed by many, to the eft'ect that 
he entertained a great admiration for Washington, and that he even 
went so far as to send him a sword upon which was inscribed, 
"' From the oldest general in the world to the greatest." This is one 
of those many historical myths that have been eagerly accepted by 



Frederick the Great and the Revolution 478 

a willing and credulous public, and it has been completely exploded.^ 
Furthermore, as Bancroft admits, there is nowhere in Frederick's 
correspondence any trace of a personal interest in Washington.^ 
Much the same may be affirmed of his interest in the colonies. His 
rather friendly attitude toward them was due chiefly to his hatred 
for England and to his desire to keep a way open for commercial 
relations with the new power in case it should sustain its independ- 
ence. There is little or no evidence to prove that sentiment was a 
factor in determining his policy. 

Paul Leland Haworth. 

' See an article by Moncure D. Conway in 77;.? Century Magazine, XIX. 945. 
2 Preface to Vol. X. (original edition, 1874). 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 










%tW\ ( 




